Siege of Pskov 1240–1242
The siege of Pskov, conducted by the Livonian branch of the Teutonic Order in 1240–1242, was the principal Russian campaign of the Order’s early history and one of the most ambitious Russian operations of the medieval Latin West. The siege was a turning point in the Order’s eastern campaigns: the Order’s army, which had been operating deep in Russian territory, was forced to withdraw in the face of a Russian counter-offensive that culminated in the battle on the ice of Lake Peipus on 5 April 1242. The Order’s Russian frontier was, stabilised on the line of Lake Peipus and the Narva river.
The siege of Pskov is, a case study in the limits of the Order’s Russian campaigns. The Order’s army, in 1240–1242, was operating at the outer limit of its strategic reach, in a theatre that was, in significant part, beyond the Order’s logistical capability.
The Russian Theatre of the 1240s
The Russian theatre of the Teutonic Order’s campaigns in the 1240s was, the most demanding of the Order’s early campaigns. The Order’s principal Russian opponents were the Republic of Novgorod, a great commercial city on the Volkhov river, and the city of Pskov, a smaller but heavily fortified city to the west. The Order’s principal Russian campaign of the period was the campaign of 1240–1242, in which a combined Livonian-Teutonic army, reinforced by crusaders from the German lands, campaigned deep into the Russian frontier zone.
The campaign was, in the conventional accounts, a substantial success in its early stages. The Order’s army took Izborsk in 1240, took Pskov in 1241, and campaigned, in the summer of 1241, into the upper Dvina basin. The Order’s army was, however, forced to withdraw, in the spring of 1242, in the face of a Russian counter-offensive.
The Siege
The siege of Pskov itself was conducted in 1241, after the Order’s army had taken the city by storm. The Order’s army installed a garrison in the city, and the Order’s army continued its campaign into the upper Dvina basin. The Russian response to the fall of Pskov was, however, swift and decisive. Prince Alexander Nevsky of Novgorod, having been recalled from his exile in the Mongol empire, raised a substantial army and marched to the relief of Pskov.
The Russian relief force arrived at Pskov in the spring of 1242, and the Russian relief force proceeded to besiege the Order’s garrison in the city. The Order’s garrison, after a short siege, surrendered the city to the Russian relief force. The Order’s Russian campaign of 1240–1242 was, in this sense, a strategic failure: the Order’s army had taken the city of Pskov by storm, but the Order’s army had been unable to hold the city in the face of a Russian counter-offensive.
The Russian relief of Pskov was, a turning point in the Order’s Russian campaigns. The Order’s army, having been forced to withdraw from the Russian frontier zone, was pursued by the Russian army into the Order’s Livonian territory. The Russian pursuit culminated, on 5 April 1242, in the battle on the ice of Lake Peipus, in which the Russian army defeated the Order’s army on the frozen surface of the lake.
The Russian Defence of Pskov
The Russian recovery of Pskov in 1242 was a substantial military achievement. The Russian counter-offensive, organised by Prince Alexander Nevsky of Novgorod (later known as Alexander Nevsky in Russian national memory) and supported by the citizens of Pskov, expelled the Order’s garrison in the spring of 1242. The Russian recovery of Pskov was, in significant part, the foundation of the broader Russian resistance to the Order’s Russian campaigns. The Russian principalities of Novgorod and Pskov were, in the operational sense, very formidable adversaries.
The Disposition of the Forces
The Order’s army at the siege of Pskov was, by the standards of the age, a substantial force. The Order’s principal strength was the Livonian knight-brothers, of whom perhaps 100 to 200 took the field. The Order’s army was supported by a substantial number of crusaders from the German lands, by Livonian auxiliary troops, and by Estonian and Latvian auxiliaries. The total strength has been variously estimated at 2,000 to 4,000 men.
The Russian relief force at Pskov was, by contrast, substantially larger. The Russian contingent comprised the feudal levies of the Republic of Novgorod and a substantial number of auxiliary troops from the surrounding Russian principalities. The Russian relief force was, in the conventional accounts, perhaps 5,000 to 7,000 men, of whom perhaps 3,000 to 4,000 were effective fighting men.
The Order’s army was, in the tactical sense, a heavy cavalry force of considerable shock action. The Russian relief force was, by contrast, a mixed force: the Russian contingent was, on the whole, an infantry force of considerable staying power, while the auxiliary contingents were a mixed force of infantry and light cavalry. The two forces were, in the tactical sense, very different.
The Significance of the Siege
The siege of Pskov in 1240–1242 was, a turning point in the Order’s Russian campaigns. The Order’s Russian frontier was, for the next two centuries, stabilised on the line of Lake Peipus and the Narva river. The Order’s principal Russian opponents, the Republic of Novgorod and the city of Pskov, were, able to maintain their independence throughout the middle ages. The Order’s Russian campaigns continued, with varying intensity, until the late fifteenth century, but the Order was never again able to penetrate the Russian frontier on the scale of the 1240 campaign.
The siege illustrates, on the one hand, the substantial military capability of the Order’s army in the early thirteenth century: the Order’s army was able to take the city of Pskov by storm, and the Order’s army was able to campaign deep into the Russian frontier zone. The siege illustrates, on the other, the substantial military capability of the Order’s Russian opponents: the Russian principalities were very formidable adversaries, and the Order’s Russian campaigns were, the campaigns in which the Order was to be checked.
Sources
- Biskup, Marian, and Gerard Labuda. Dzieje zakonu krzyżackiego w Prusach. Gdańsk: Wydawnictwo Morskie, 1986.
- Boockmann, Hartmut. Der Deutsche Orden: Zwölf Kapitel aus seiner Geschichte. Munich: Beck, 1981.
- Hjorth, Poul, ed. Henrici Cronicon Lyvoniae. Copenhagen: Copenhagen University, 1962.
Related Reading
For the broader context of the Order’s Baltic campaigns, see the cluster on Baltic warfare and the pillar on military campaigns. For the Russian campaign of the same period, see the article on the battle on the ice. For the Order’s military organisation in Livonia, see the Livonian branch and the cluster on convent castles.